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TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the United States of America

OUTGOING (AmEmbassy London

SECRET

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Charge:

Control:

Date:

B1, EC

To Asst. Secretary Tyler from Bruce.

Submitted to Duncan Sandys points set forth in your message on BG.

1. HMG intends to go forward with elections as planned.

2. UK has been taking all practicable steps to repress violence.

3. HMG does not preclude sending additional force to BG, but would be most reluctant to do so in light other obligations and political objections here.

4 and 5. HMG has under continuing study possibility of coalition, but has reached no conclusion, nor will do so before prior consultation with us.

Sandys is worried over steady deterioration of situation in BG. He thinks highly of the Governor who has reported three possibilities present themselves:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY 229 DATE 6-18-81
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a. Maintenance of ~~present~~ current unsatisfactory state of affairs.

b. Reimposition of complete colonial rule.

c. Coalition between Jagan and Burnham.

Sandys had sent for me just before I received your message. He said he wanted us to know the lines along which he had been thinking, and was

/communicating

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communicating his preliminary views to the British Embassy Washington and myself. He is worried lest, as reported by Governor, PR might result in a small majority for or against Jagan.

I assume that before you respond to Eric Williams' proposals USG will have full discussions with HMG. This should, I believe, be done before Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference next week.

I should observe that throughout dealings with Sandys on this subject, I think he has done everything he reasonably could to accommodate HMG policy to our own suggestions, despite considerable opposition, in some respects, from certain of his colleagues, and criticisms from the Opposition.

AMB:DBruce/eo - July 2, 1964

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69

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B1, E1

August 19, 1964 - Wednesday

Sad good-byes this morning. E and I motored to Knloss, took the Convair jet, and reached Northolt in an hour and twenty minutes.

Went to the office and read the Cyprus telegrams. Lunched at White's, sat next to Mr. Maxwell, whose family own a stretch of the Beauly next to Mrs. Hammond He showed me a photograph of seven salmon he killed yesterday, then atoned for rubbing salt into my wounds by inviting me, if I go back, to a day's fishing next week.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY Loki Johnson DATE 6-18-81
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The Cyprus problem appears even murkier than heretofore. Kyprianou, the tricky Cypriot Foreign Minister, is expected to go to Moscow Friday, there to meet K., who has presumably curtailed his vacation by a week for this purpose. If they concoct a formula, promising Soviet military support under certain circumstances, the cat (Makarios) will really be amongst the pigeons. Therefore, swift countermeasures are required.

I met Messrs. Butler, Carrington and Caccia at the Foreign Office this afternoon. Butler said he wished to support our policy of giving Acheson additional time to play his hand, but thought we should address ourselves at once to contingency planning of what to do if this approach were to fail.

It was decided I should telephone or telegraph Ball; also, I should elicit from him his views on contingency planning. This I did; he promised to give me a reply during the course of the U.S. night (five hours difference in time). I stressed the importance of keeping HMG fully informed, with which he was in accord.

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I talked to George again this evening; he intends to have a telecon with Acheson in Geneva after midnight (Washington), and will inform us of the result. DI, ED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY Wm Johnson DATE 6.18.81
PORTIONS DENIED AS INDICATED

August 20, 1964 - Thursday

Sunny day. Temperature 60°. Ball is exceptionally satisfactory as an informant. I received a telegram from him this morning, outlining possible courses of action. I had him on the telephone at 6 a.m. Washington time--he had been up all night to communicate with Acheson, and [redacted] just finished his interchange with Geneva. He left it to my discretion to impart to the British details of what it was proposed to do. This I shall carry out in a meeting with Rab Butler and others this afternoon. The British are almost more vitally involved in this affair than ourselves; they have been completely cooperative and helpful; I intend to continue to treat them with ample confidence.

Grivas is not as forthcoming about concessions to the Turks as is the Greek Government, nor is it clear [redacted] how he might overthrow the cunning Archbishop.

I am snowed under by telegrams about Cyprus, frustrating and generally gloomy.

I went to the Foreign Office this afternoon, and told Butler, Carrington and Caccia of the latest developments in the scenario. They are sceptical of Acheson being able to bring about an accord between the Greeks and Turks, then of the Greeks imposing it on Makarios. They wished him well in the enterprise. We agreed he should play the lone wolf, with their standing by to give support, if requested.

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SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

support in any way we wish. I suggested they use the Hood-Acheson link exclusively for the present.

EXCISE
B1, E D

Lunched at White's.

The Greek Government attitude is distinctly encouraging, but we must still await their final word in writing. Thereafter, the Turks will have to be cajoled, wheedled and persuaded.

REVIEWED BY Tom Johnson DATE 6-18-81
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Kypreanou is not going, as planned, to Moscow today; presumably, he will leave tomorrow.

I returned to the Foreign Office this afternoon, to mull over latest information with Caccia and Dodson.

Cabot Lodge's aide, Roberts, telephoned me from Copenhagen this evening to say [redacted] Lodge now wishes to visit London Friday, August 28, and meet Cabinet Ministers, including the Prime Minister, over the weekend, even if he must fly to distant places to see them. I explained how impracticable this was, since it would require an entire night or day trip to call on either the PM or Butler; also Carrington is commencing his vacation on the 28th. I urged that Cabot accept Butler's invitation to lunch with him, Caccia, and others on Tuesday, September 1. Of all capitals, this is the one where an exposition of U. S. policy in Vietnam will be old hat. They have been minutely informed about it for years. If it were not a case of completing the record, there would be no point in Lodge wasting his time here.

I had never seen the famous Italian film Dolce Vita until tonight. Although

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SECRET

EXCISE

heralded as sensational, orgiastic, corrupting, decadent, I found these descriptions misleading, and thought it disappointing and cheap as compared with the more vigorous vitality and versimilitude of Tom Jones.

B1, ED

We had word that the Department of Justice is looking into the acceptability, from an anti-trust standpoint, of the purchase by Sotheby of a controlling interest in Park-Bernet. I find this idiotic.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY RWJohnson DATE 6-18-81
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Sent a telegram tonight to George Ball as instructed, expressing views on how future British efforts should be meshed in with ours on Cyprus tactics.

Today's betting odds against the Conservatives have declined to 2-1.

I sent this telegram to Washington:

"For Under Secretary from Ambassador.

I have kept Brits informed of latest developments. They offer full support, but have decided for present, with which I agree, to have Hood take such action as Acheson may suggest, and not involve their other posts unless and until we request it.

With respect to the proposed Turk-Greek deal, questions raised by King Constantine are obviously germane. Answers will be helpful to me here in clarifying picture to Brits.

Also, although mopping up in UN, NATO and elsewhere is for later attention, I think we should as far as practicable, let Brits know soonest what line we propose to take, and would like HMG to adopt in these international organizations in order to hold situation while developments are taking place in Cyprus."

August 22, 1964 - Saturday

Like yesterday, clear, sunny, cool (62°).

Digested the overnight take of telegrams, then saw Caccia and Dodson at the Foreign Office.

Lunched at Brooks' Club.

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Acheson expects to receive this afternoon the formal Greek reply from Papandreou.

B1, ED

Back to the Foreign Office this afternoon.

By evening, the Geneva patchwork became unstuck. Papandreou said he could not carry through on the Acheson plan, either with his own public or with the Greek Cypriots. The Turks also have backtracked. They say that if our proposal is unchanged, Inonu will submit it to his Government for final decision, but will not support it; to do so would end his political career. The limit for him is the original Acheson proposal.

Reliance by the Greek Government upon Grivas to dispose of Makarios appears to have evaporated. Presently they plan on a twenty-day program--essentially of propaganda--to eliminate the Archbishop. This seems fanciful.

Cabot Lodge called me from Copenhagen, and will postpone his London visit to August 31.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY W R Johnson DATE 6-18-81
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August 23, 1964 - Sunday

The most beautiful weather imaginable--cloudless sky.

At the office, I read Acheson's telegram, suggesting a fall-back position [redacted]. He would return home.

Went to the Foreign Office to talk to Caccia and Rennie. We could not summon up much optimism.

Lunched at White's with Hamish Hamilton, then walked to Grosvenor Square with entertaining Henry Garnett.

Ball's reply to Dean's sign-off message is a lulu. He thinks there should be no let-down of our pressures in Athens and Ankara, and no admission of other options being open. He believes that Acheson's suggestions are in the nature of a

premature obituary. He regards it as unwise "to perform extreme unction over Geneva without a valedictory visit by Acheson to Athens and Ankara."

EXCISE

75

B1, ED

Eilts and I went at 6 p.m. to see Caccia and Rennie at the Foreign Office.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY Tom Johnson DATE 6-18-81
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August 24, 1964 - Monday

Have not been out today, with the exception of the usual morning visit to the Foreign Office, where Eilts and I saw Carrington, Caccia, Dodson, and Rennie.

Overnight, we had telegrams from Ball and Acheson which, in effect, reversed, to a considerable extent, positions taken by them two days ago.

Dean Acheson generally endorsed his various proposals upon which he has asked for comments from Ankara, Athens, and London.

I am genuinely alarmed over the import of this line of reasoning.

Lunched in the office on a club sandwich and a bloody Mary.

Spent much of the afternnon thinking about and writing the following telegram:

I telephoned George Ball, but the hot line was preempted by the White House before I could finish. I suggested to him the possibility of his meeting, in Washington or Geneva, Acheson, Hare, Labouisse, Finletter and myself before the USG committed itself to any drastic decision. I hesitated to cast this fly; the fish did not rise. I think he is probably right in not leaving any of the posts uncovered at this juncture; also the publicity would be wide, injudicious, inaccurate, and harmful.

I have spoken to E each night on the telephone. They killed 10 brace of grouse, walking up, on Saturday. Letitia Elliott has joined them; she will arrive here tonight to stay at the house before leaving tomorrow for Washington.

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Drafted by Ambassador [illegible]

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NODIS REVIEW
Cat. A - Exception removed; transferred to O/FADRC
Cat. B - Transferred to O/FADRC with additional access controlled by S/S
Cat. C - Caption and custody removed by S/S
Reviewed by: [illegible]
Date: 2-25-81 19

" NODIS-TAG - For Under Secretary Ball from Bruce

I have deep misgivings about implication of possible use of American military power against Turks.

It seems to me that the problem confronting us is whether a Communist Cyprus looms imminently enough to hazard the profound disillusion and consequences such threatened action would certainly create in Turkey, and elsewhere. The adverse effects of Turkish bitterness would extend even beyond NATO and CENTO;

I see little in the overall proposal attractive to the Turks, but Hare can speak to that. I should think it unlikely that Inonu would place much faith, in the absence of an American guarantee, in Byzantine Papandreou's eventual capability or willingness to give Turkey the concessions Inonu needs to placate his own military and public. If Inonu is discredited, after him what?

It seems probable from Athens ___ and Geneva's ___ that Papandreou is speaking as the mouthpiece of Grivas rather than vice versa, which, in view of Grivas record and statements, augurs ill for future Greek concessions acceptable to the Turks.

In the event of a Turkish military reaction to instant enosis, how could we, consistent with our past professions, interpose the Sixth Fleet, and assume the risk of shooting at Turks? I wonder if we have the right to make a decision so crucial for the NATO alliance without adequate consultation with our principal NATO partners. This is, of course, quite another thing than using diplomatic persuasion with the Turks to prevent their military intervention.

The Soviets would, I imagine, be exultant over the position in which we would find ourselves if we were to pursue such a course.

We have done our best to bring about a reasonable settlement; no diplomatic negotiation could have been better conducted.

Now, in frustration, we are perhaps thinking of taking upon ourselves the responsibility for trying to solve in a hasty fashion what has thus far been insoluble by hectoring the Turks to a point where they may revolt against the NATO and CENTO alliances. If Turkey, feeling herself rebuffed and deserted were to become hostile to the West, or even neutralist in the East-West struggle, we would witness, I believe a catastrophic change for the worse in the whole Western position. It is almost the only nation in the eastern end of the Mediterranean thus far untained by Communist influence.

If the enosis enterprise were undertaken, and resulted in a direct Greek-Turkish clash because the US had not militarily deterred the Turks, an immediate NATO Ministers meeting should be called. The fat would be in the fire, but at least we would not unilaterally have fought against a NATO ally.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY [illegible] DATE 6-18-81
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If we decide proceed with plan, I sugges that Acheson should visit London before returning to US. There are certain to be British doubts about wisdom of our proposed course of action which only he might be able to allay."

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